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Problem Setting
Till the end of the sixties ASEAN-EEC trade relations
exhibited the pattern of a traditional division of
labour between primary commodity suppliers from LDCs
and manufactured goods suppliers from DCs. The 19 73
energy price shock and the following discussion on
primary commodity cartels resp. commodity agreements
within a New International Economic Order could have
theoretically induced the EEC to perpetuate this pat-
tern by institutionalizing its trade relations to
ASEAN under the major objective of a safe access to
input markets in primary commodities.
However, any EEC trade policy being confined to this
sole aspect would have been misleading against the
background of a rapid sectoral change in the ASEAN ex-
port flows to the EEC during the last decade. Within
nine years (1968-1977) the ASEAN countries doubled the
share of semi-manufactures and manufactures in their
exports to the EEC from about 25 percent to more than
50 percent. To a great extent this may have been the
outcome of an export-oriented industrialization policy
pursued in most of the ASEAN economies and assisted by
other "environmental" export stimulants such as the
elimination of undervaluation of some EEC curren-
cies and its positive impact on "footloose" EEC invest-
ments in ASEAN countries, aggressive wage policies of
Paper to be presented at the ASEAN-EEC workshop organized
by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore,
6-8 August, 1981, Singapore. The author is indebted to
Dean Spinanger for critical comments.EEC trade unions as well as a world-wide lowering of tariff
barriers due to the multilateral GATT negotiations on tariff
cuts and tariff rate harmonizations.
Apart from the supply-oriented policies and the "environmen-
tal" changes the obvious drain towards a new intra-manufac-
tures division of labour between the aging EEC economies and
the newly industrialized ASEAN countries may have also been
affected by specific EEC trade policies in manufactures to-
wards LDCs in general and some groups of LDCs (ACP countries,
Mediterranean countries) in particular.
These policies starting with the beginning of the seven-
ties, however, did not only encompass trade-stimulating com-
ponents such as non-reciprocal tariff cuts within the scheme
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) but also gra-
dually incorporated selective non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in
the same measure as some LDCs proved to be highly competi-
tive in various branches.
Among the LDCs seriously affected by both trade-stimulating
and trade-deterrent EEC policies are four ASEAN countries
(Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) which in
1977 accounted for about 85 percent of EEC manufactured im-
ports from ASEAN.Hence the EEC tariff and non-tariff treat-
ment of ASEAN manufactured exports mirrors something of the
conflicting tendencies in EEC trade policies linking stimu-
lating and deterrent measures in a package-deal approach.
The main purpose of this paper is, besides an identification
of the structural changes in ASEAN manufactured exports and
of the different competitive footings of the five ASEAN
countries in the various EEC markets,
- to assess whether the GSP in general stimulated manufactured
exports in the sense that they would have not been occurred
without preferential treatment
The 1980 ASEAN-EEC trade and cooperation agreement does not
provide a specific preferential treatment and is therefore
not mentioned here.- 3 -
- to trace briefly the consequences of the confusing paralle-
lism of Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth ASEAN countries
resp. of Commonwealth preferences, UK GSP scheme and EEC
GSP scheme; a differentiation which became politically re-
levant after the UK access to the community
- to analyse in detail the specific shortcomings of the GSP
scheme for ASEAN and
- to investigate the extent of and the possible reasons for
some evidently diverging national trade policies of various
EEC countries against ASEAN manufactures, especially in
textiles.
Since the analysis focuses on trade policies on the demand
side, a disaggregation by countries also stresses the diffe-
rent export performances of ASEAN as a whole in various EEC
countries. A statistical breakdown of the export perfor-
mances of ASEAN country X in EEC country Y is provided as
far as the GSP is concerned but it would by far exceed the
scope of the paper to discuss each square in the ASEAN
country - EEC country trade matrix.
The Growth Pattern of ASEAN Manufactured Exports to the EEC
1968 - 1977
Three major shifts characterize the growth pattern of ASEAN
manufactured exports to the EEC during the 1968 - 77 period:
First, a sectoral shift from raw material-intensive (Ricardo-)
goods such as food, vegetable oils and fats (in the tables
included in chemicals) and unwrought copper and tin (non-
ferrous metals) towards either labour-intensive finished
goods (clothing) or some labour-intensive components within
an international intra-industry specialization (electronics,
machinery parts, some fabrics etc.). This shift (appendix
table 1"), however, did not cover the entire Ricardo-goods
sector. One major exception refers to wood products whose
share in total EEC imports from ASEAN stagnated on a- 4 -
20 percent level. Whereas the results for the community as
a whole reflect the even more distinct shifts in the West
German market, other EEC countries exhibit a rather hetero-
genous pattern with sometimes countervailing shifts to those
for the community. Roughly one can group West Germany, the
Netherlands and the UK as those countries whose initial im-
port structure in 1968 displayed the highest degree of di-
versification compared to the rest of the community and which
still kept this rank in 1977 (together with France).
The second, regionally oriented, shift can be derived from
2
the empirical evidence that imports in complementary raw
material-intensive goods face lower price elasticities of
demand than substitutive finished goods and that overall in-
come elasticities of demand rise if new more sophisticated
product lines enter the export supply. Hence those EEC
countries which shifted their demand for ASEAN manufactures
towards those product lines gained higher shares in total
EEC manufactured imports from ASEAN during the reference
period (appendix table 2").
West Germany which in 1968 comprised about a quarter of to-
tal EEC manufactured imports from ASEAN increased this share
to one third in 1977. In rapidly growing export industries
as clothing and machinery the West German share even climbed
to more than 40 percent. Again the patterns of the other
EEC countries yield heterogenous results among which the
decrease of the UK share seems to be the most essential one
for ASEAN, especially for Malaysia and Singapore, since in
1968 resp. 1977 about 90 resp. 80 percent of UK manufactured
imports from ASEAN originated in these two Commonwealth
members.
See Robert M. Stern, Jonathan Francis and Bruce Schumacher,
Price Elasticities in International Trade: An Annotated
Bibliography. London: MacMillan, 1976, Chapter 2, pp. 12-26,
During the reference period the UK share in EEC manufac-
tured imports from the two Commonwealth members dropped
from 38 to 25 percent.- 5 -
Though the following analysis focus on policy tools as some
possible determinants of the shifts, especially of the re-
gional ones, other factors which are not further discussed
4
should not be neglected . Above all the transition from the
Bretton Woods system to flexible exchange rates resulted in
considerable divergencies in EEC country exchange rate
changes vis-a-vis the dollar as well as in ASEAN country
exchange rates changes . In real terms all EEC members as
well as all ASEAN countries appreciated vis-a-vis the dollar
during 1968/77 with West Germany by far in the lead. By ba-
lancing EEC and ASEAN real exchange rates 1968 and 1977 it
emerges that the ASEAN currencies depreciated uniformly only
vis-a-vis the German mark and the Danish crown so that the
observed regional shifts in export flows towards both mar-
kets may also be explained to some extent by diverging ex-
change rate changes (appendix table 3"). According to
table 3
:
: the relative competitive footing of ASEAN exports
to the other six markets - compared with exports to West
Germany and Denmark - deteriorated visibly, with France and
the UK in the lead. The results also suggest that among the
ASEAN members the exchange rate-induced export prospects
improved mainly for Malaysia and the Philippines, to the
detriment of Indonesia in particular.
With the exception of the latter country, whose currency
movements deviated considerably from those of the other ASEAN
members, the overall exchange rate changes in total may have
4
EEC country differences in per capita income levels, urba-
nization, penetration of markets by specific sales chains
(i.e. mail order houses) and income distribution may be
some of these factors.
In this context we only refer to average medium term ex-
change rate changes over a nine years period in order to
converge exchange rate changes with the manufactured ex-
port flow changes within the same period. Hence we abstract
from short term variability as well as from changes of the
"numeraire" (fixed currency peg, pegging to baskets, gene-
ralized floating etc.) which both in the short run may have
adversely affected especially ASEAN primary commodity ex-
ports being outside the scope of this paper. See for an
analysis stressing the adverse effects of uncertainty asso-
ciated with increased short-term variability of flexible
exchange rates and enhanced by the inavailability of an ade-
quate forward cover Pradumna B. Rana, Flexible Exchange
Rates and ASEAN Trade. Summarized in ISEAS, ASEAN Economic
Research Unit, Newsletter 80/2, December 1980.- 6 -
facilitated ASEAN exports to the EEC as witnessed by the 10
percent real depreciation of an unweighted ASEAN currency
basket vis-a-vis an unweighted EEC currency basket. Measured
over a nine years period, however, the annual changes (3 per-
cent at the maximum) have been small and should therefore not
be regarded as a decisive stimulus for the overall ASEAN ma-
nufactured export expansion during this period.
The change in the aggregate EEC-ASEAN trade balance in manu-
factures - the third major shift - lends further support to
this assumption. In spite of the overall real depreciation
and a successful export diversification of ASEAN suppliers
the EEC trade surplus in nominal terms doubled during the
reference period (appendix table 4
::) resp. remained constant
in real terms if the unit value index of world manufactured
exports is used as the deflator. Not surprisingly, EEC trans-
port equipment and machinery exports mainly contributed to
this surplus and outweighed by far the increasing deficits
in textiles, clothing, wood and non-ferrous metals. Hence
the division of labour between ASEAN and EEC during this pe-
riod reflects inter-industry specialization trends in simple
consumer goods and raw material-intensive intermediates as
well as a beginning intra-industry specialization in the ma-
chinery industry .
Among the EEC countries the UK proved to be the major source
of the trade surplus mainly because it ran a much smaller
deficit in the traditional ASEAN export industries than West
Germany. Otherwise the overproportional increase of the West
German surplus in the machinery sector would have put this
country in the top rank of the EEC surplus members. Whether
the deficit divergencies between the two major EEC markets
for ASEAN can be attributed to different degrees of import
barriers will be discussed later on particularly for tex-
tiles and clothing.
The intra-industry specialization argument holds though
the machinery sector includes the wide range of miscella-
neous industries (toys, sport equipment, office supplies
and professional goods).- 7 -
In accordance with these results the comparative advantages
for ASEAN - as measured by the modified Balassa RCA-concept
improved along the whole range of industries, however, starting
from different stages and with a different speed (appendix
table 5
:c). Furthermore, some differences emerge with respect
to the development of comparative advantages of the individual
ASEAN countries vis-a-vis the EEC (appendix table 6"). Apart
from Indonesia whose export orientation in manufactures towards
industrialized economies, probably due to the larger import
substitution potential, still visibly lags behind the other
ASEAN members, Singapore and Thailand for example have achieved
different patterns of comparative advantages: Whereas Singapore
has succeeded in cutting down the EEC advantages in transport
equipment and machinery, Thailand has concentrated its ad-
vantages on textiles and clothing. Such a divergency in the
RCA-patterns of individual ASEAN members provokes trade po-
licy implications as far as a competition between ASEAN
members for a restricted EEC market access is concerned.
The higher the differences in the individual patterns of
advantages would emerge the less justified concerns about
an "overlap" of say two ASEAN countries export flows on the
community market would be and the less trade diverting ef-
fects would arise in case the EEC would introduce selective
trade policy measures against individual ASEAN members.
9
Such an overlap-index has been calculated on the four-digit-
See for the original concept Bela Balassa, Trade Liberali-
sation and "Revealed" Comparative Advantage. The Manchester
School of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 33 (1965) pp.
99-117. - For modifications cf. Juergen B. Donges and James
Riedel, The Expansion of Manufactured Exports in Developing
Countries: An Empirical Assessment of Supply and Demand
Issues. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 113 (1977) pp.
58-87. - Bela Balassa, The Changing Pattern of Comparative
Advantage in Manufactured Goods. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, Vol. 61 (1979) pp. 259-266.
o
The author accepts that the existence of entrepot-trade and
reexports does not allow for a strict convergency between
goods originated in Singapore and those shipped from Singa-
pore. Since the import statistics of the EEC reporting
countries do not differentiate according to domestic ex-
ports and reexports, the country specific conclusions should
be "deflated" correspondingly.
9
See for the introduction of this index J.M. Finger, M.E. Krei-
nin, A Measure of "Export Similarity" and its Possible Uses.
The Economic Journal, Vol. 89 (1979) pp. 9o5-912.CCCN level which comprises about 300 tariff items and for
the 1979 ASEAN manufactured and semi-manufactured GSP exports




The results basically suggest a negligible overlap between
individual ASEAN country exports with one exception: In 1979
about 48 percent of Malaysian preferential exports to West
Germany was "matched" by corresponding Indonesian exports
11
(and vice versa) . Till 1978 (the end of Commonwealth pre-
ferences) this relatively high overlap could have theoreti-
cally implied some tariff discrimination of Indonesian ex-
ports to the UK market because of the traditional Commonwealth
1 2 preferences in agricultures for Malaysia
To sum up, at least four of the five ASEAN countries success-
fully expanded their exports in traditional labour-intensive
and raw material-intensive branches and to some extent pene-
trated into more sophisticated product lines of the trans-
port equipment and machinery branch. Both export expansion
and diversification, however, could not outweigh the per-
sistent trade deficit of ASEAN with the EEC in manufactures
which in real terms remained constant during the reference
period. Thus the export-oriented industrialization in most
of the ASEAN economies has also implied an increasing de-
mand for sophisticated manufactured imports from the EEC.
The general outcome of studies on trade in manufactures be-
tween advanced industrialized countries and the NICs that
1 3 trade is a two-way process is hence underlined by the actual
ASEAN-EEC trade pattern.
The textile sector has been excluded from this calculation,
since the strict import quota (sensitive goods) do not
allow for conclusions based on the trade overlap-index.
This overlap is mainly due to similar export pattern in
processed agricultures (refined vegetable oils, processed
fruits).
1 2
Provided that the overlap coefficients can be generalized
as being relevant for all EEC markets. The aspect of the
Commonwealth preferences in discussed below.
Louis Turner et al., Living with the Newly Industrializing
Countries, Chatham House Papers, No. 7, The Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs, London 1980, p. 51.- 9 -
The Export Expansion of ASEAN Towards the EEC;
Preference-Induced or Not?
As the first industrialized country resp. group the EEC of
the Six established its GSP in Mid 1971. In 1974 the three
new members Denmark, Ireland and the UK aligned their in-
dividual schemes in effect since 19 72 to that of the EEC in
accordance to their accession to the community. The basic
options of the EEC scheme whose details are discussed for
1 4
ASEAN exports below imply a duty-free treatment on eli-
gible industrial goods and tariff reductions as well as
exemptions on eligible agricultural products, however, with
a priori limitations taking the form of obligatory tariff
quota (sensitive products), obligatory resp. facultative
ceilings for semi-sensitive and non-sensitive products, ma-
ximum-amount limitations for individual beneficiaries (bu-
toirs) and intra-EEC allocation rules for sensitive pro-
ducts and individual EEC countries.
The answer to the question of whether the EEC GSP contri-
buted to the above-concluded ASEAN export expansion or not
is closely related to another question of what would have
happened without preferences. The choice of such a hypothe-
tical reference system is facilitated by the fact that
the United States introduced their GSP only in 1976 and Ca-
nada not earlier than 1974. The development of ASEAN ex-
ports to these two markets during 1968 and 19 75 may there-
fore roughly be regarded as the reference system "without
preferential treatment"
1 4
See for a general analysis of the GSP Tracy Murray, Trade
Preferences for Developing Countries, London and Basing-
stoke: MacMillan, 1977. - Ann Weston, Vincent Cable and
Adrian Hewitt, The EEC's Generalized System of Preferen-
ces - Evaluation and Recommendations for Change, London:
Overseas Development Institute, 19 80.
In view of the low share of Canada in the combined im-
ports of the two countries and of the implementation
problems of the GSP after its introduction it seems to
be plausible that the Canadian 1974/75 preferential im-
ports do not distort the hypothetical reference system.- 10 -
However, the findings from a regional export performance
comparison should be cautiously interpreted., This is be-
cause the conditions of other factors being equal are only
to some extent fulfilled in the EEC-9 - US/Canada compari-
son of the ASEAN export performance (table 8"). The share
of ASEAN in both regions manufactured imports from LDCs
resp. total imports initially deviated by about 5 percent
points resp. 1 percent point, but partially converged to a
common share of about 10-11 percent in imports from LDCs
following a rising trend in the EEC and a stagnating one in
the US/Canada market. Instead, a slightly rising trend of the
ASEAN participation in total manufactured imports is common
to both industrialized areas.
Though the ASEAN countries do not enjoy a privileged status
within the group of GSP beneficiaries it is by all means
possible that they overproportionally benefited from the
preferences, say because of a relatively high convergence
between the GSP product coverage and their export supply or
strong ties to experienced importers which apply for the pre-
ferences during the customs clearance process etc. Hence,
there may have been a preference-induced trade impact for
the ASEAN countries even if such an impact could not be
assessed for the total of the beneficiaries.
Two aspects should therefore be tackled independently. First,
did the GSP scheme facilitate LDCs exports to the EEC in
general? Second, in what direction did the ASEAN group de-
viate from this general pattern?
The concept by which the preference-induced trade expansion
for the beneficiaries as a group is assessed, is a familiar
1 6 one . It assumes that due to the preferences the ex-post
changes of import-apparent consumption-ratios in the EEC
See Mordechai E. Kreinin, Trade Relations of the EEC. An
Empirical Investigation, New York: Praeger, 1974, pp. 30-
41. - Mordechai E. Kreinin, Static Effect of E.C. Enlarge-
ment on Trade Flows in Manufactured Products, Kyklos,
Vol. 34 (1981) pp. 60-71.- 11 -
during the 1968/75 period, disaggregated by imports from be-
neficiaries and non-beneficiaries, deviate from those which
can be observed in the United States/Canada market during
the same period under conditions of non-preferential market
access. The change in the US/Canada ratio is hence taken as
the "normal" pattern of LDCs export performance on indu-
strialized markets. In accordance to Kreinin and also Ba-
lassa (using changes in ex post income elasticities of de-
mand instead of import apparent consumption ratios) the re-
duction of domestic production has two sources; gross trade
creation (GTC) and trade diversion (TD). GTC denotes the
change in the ratio between imports from beneficiaries and
apparent consumption (resp. change in the demand elasticity
against imports from beneficiaries) and TD the change in
the ratio between imports from non-beneficiaries and apparent
consumption. In our context a negative trade diversion (some-
times denoted as external trade creation) would say that EEC
imports from non-LDCs as a proportion of apparent consumption
increased by more (or declined by less) than the corresponding
change in the US import-apparent consumption ratio. This in
fact emerges from the estimates (table 1).
During 1968 and 19 75 imports in general contributed to a
stronger reduction of domestic production within the EEC
than did the imports of the US/Canada area. However, the
increase of EEC imports from non-LDC sources outweighed by
far the increase of imports from LDCs. Since imports from
non-LDCs are to a great extent equivalent to the intra-EEC
trade this result does not surprise. In 1968 the EEC fi-
nished the transition towards a customs union and introduced
the common external tariff. The emerging intra-EEC trade in-
centives will have probably lasted through the whole period
until 1975. In addition EEC imports from non-LDCs will have
been enforced by the first EEC-EFTA tariff cut steps (start-
ing from April 1973).
Whereas the trade diversion figures do not indicate any
preference-induced shift in EEC imports from non-LDC sources
on a relatively high aggregation level of eleven manufacturing_ 12 _
Table 1 : Shifts in EEC Inport-Apparent Consunption-Ratios due to EEC Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries and
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where GTC and TD denote gross trade creation resp. trade diversion, m the ratio between iitports from beneficiaries and apparent
amsunption, m-" the ratio between imports from non-beneficiaries (non-LDCs) and apparent consumption C, the indices o and 1
the years 1968and 1974/75 average and the indices EEC and US the importing areas of the European Comnunity (including UK,
Ireland and Denmark) and the USA plus Canada. -
 c A negative diversion effect is sometimes denoted as "external trade crea-
tion". -
 d Trade Expansion, i.e. the sum of gross trade creation and trade diversion, is also denoted as "trade creation
proper" (Balassa). -
 e .A _ A . J\
100
.Source: Calculated from: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1979, New York, 1979.- 13 -
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sectors the overall gross trade creation estimates for the
total manufacturing sector suggest that the EEC GSP bene-
ficiaries could not augment their share in apparent con-
sumption to such an extent which exceeded that of the LDCs
share in the US/Canada market under non-preferential con-
ditions. Though there are three sectoral deviations from
the overall estimates (food, textiles, and wood) they do
not allow for a more positive judgement on the GSP trade
incentives. This is because these sectors are just the ones
which either incorporate strict quantitative limitations
both within the GSP and beyond the preference scope (tex-
tiles, plywood, veneer) or are outside the core of GSP pro-
duct coverage (food, beverages and tobacco). There may have
been therefore other factors besides the GSP which could
explain these deviations . The negative conclusions about
the preference-induced trade creation are underlined by the
fact that just in the sector where the GSP ceilings are
basically open-ended (machinery) the LDCs gained conside-
rably higher shares in the US/Canada market under "normal"
conditions than in the EEC market under the preferential
status.
Table 1 also illustrates the answer to the second question
in what direction the results for the ASEAN group deviate
from a preference-induced export performance of all deve-
loping countries in the EEC. By taking the differences be-
tween the 1968/75 changes in the import market penetration
of ASEAN (measured by the share of ASEAN manufactures in
apparent consumption) in the EEC and in the US/Canada du-
ring the reference period as a rough indicator it emerges
that the deviation from the performance of all LDCs is
1 7
One reason could be that some LDCs (for instance the
francophone African associates, the Commonwealth mem-
bers or Mediterranean countries) which benefited from
special preferential agreements expanded their exports
to the EEC stronger than their sales in the US/Canada
market. Other explanations for the deviations observed
would generally focus on business cycle differences,
differentials in the income level and income level
growth or in the intensity of intra-firm trade between
the two import markets.- 14 -
indeed negligible. Hence, in total also ASEAN performed bet-
ter under "normal" conditions in the US/Canada market than
under the preferential EEC status. This outcome even holds
although in five of the eleven sectors the ASEAN increments
in EEC market shares exceeded those of the US/Canada refe-
rence market. The positive trade expansion effects in these
sectors, however, were outweighed by an adverse performance
mainly in the chemical and machinery sector. In both sectors
ASEAN penetrated considerably stronger in the US/Canada mar-
ket than in the EEC market. Whereas for chemicals the privi-
leged market access (compared to GSP conditions) for African
associates and some Mediterranean countries in homogenous
vegetable oils could explain the absolute decline in market
shares, the heterogenous machinery sector does not allow for
arguments which are confined to a different preferential
treatment. Here other factors such as enforced US export-
1 R
oriented investments ° in ASEAN countries during the seven-
ties may have had a stronger impact on export sales than
the EEC tariff preferences.
However, the overall outcome that during 1968/75 the incre-
mental import market penetration of ASEAN in the US/Canada
market was by about 340 Mill. US-# higher than the incremen-
tal import market penetration in the EEC market, should not
be evaluated as an absolute blame for the EEC GSP. Indeed
the extra-ordinary export success of one of the few EEC GSP
non-beneficiaries among the LDCs, Taiwan, suggests that
preferential treatment may be overcompensated by other de-
terminants of export growth especially if the export supply
consists of sophisticated manufactures instead of homogenous
resp. standardized ones. The Taiwanese pattern of exports to
the EEC provides another hint for explaining differentials
in the export performance. In 1977 Taiwan directed about 45
percent of its EEC exports towards the probably most absorp-
tive West German market against only one third for ASEAN
(table 2-).
1 R
The current investigations of the US Department of Commerce
on the US majority-owned foreign affiliates suggest such an
increase. See US Department of Commerce. Survey of Current
Business, Vol. 55 (1975) No. 8, pp. 22-39, Vol. 57 (1977)
pp. 29-79.- 15 -
Any approach which eliminates the heroic assumption of a
homogenous EEC market will have to consider inter-EEC
country differentials in growth, per capita income, market
size, consumer preferences, traditional trade links, state
of import-competing industries etc. as explanatory variables,
The stronger these differences between the EEC members
emerge, however, the more likely efforts of individual EEC
members are to delink from a common trade policy in manufac-
tures, particularly if this policy is principally designed
to foster manufactured exports from LDCs (as it is the case
with the GSP) and if thus this policy collides with vested
interests of domestic suppliers and trade unions.
The latest evidence in detail discussed below suggests that
in fact EEC members are going to deviate increasingly from
the common trade policy either by drawing upon the esta-
blished escape clauses (such as Art. 115.1 EEC treaty) or
by splitting the EEC into administered and strictly con-
trolled sub-markets (such as it is practiced by the admi-
nistration of quota for sensitive GSP products for each EEC
member and by the "burden sharing" principle within the
Multifiber Agreement).
In this respect a comparison between the export performance
of LDCs on the EEC and on the US/Canada market is distorted
anyway because - irrespective of similiarities in the ab-
solute market size - the access conditions in the latter
market are more harmonized and transparent and hence the
gains in market penetration less costly to achieve than in
the EEC case. It does not seem to be unlikely that this
"harmonization" bonus for the US/Canada market may have out-
weighed the lacking preferential treatment during the 1968/
75 period.
This would mean that any benefit from the EEC GSP not only
depends on the overall competitiveness of ASEAN and other
LDCs on industrialized markets but also on the degree of
flexibility by which the export supply is shifted towards- 16 -
the most absorptive EEC sub-market (in terms of market access
conditions) resp. by which the structure of the export supply
adjusts to the specific access conditions of individual EEC
members.
Traditional trade links which still exist between Indonesia
and the Netherlands or Singapore/Malaysia and the UK impli-
citly involve an element of inertia which in the short run
may hamper the capacity of establishing new trade links with
more absorptive EEC sub-markets. On the other hand, however,
they may have to some extent guarded the individual ASEAN
countries from loosing market shares after the colonially-
determined trade concessions expired or after the respec-
tive EEC member started to impede imports in favour of do-
mestic suppliers.
In the ASEAN case the UK illustrates both alternatives: That
of a sub-market whose absorption of ASEAN manufactured ex-
ports (by shares) declined during the reference period
(table 2") and that of a market whose traditional and pri-
vileged trade links with the two ASEAN Commonwealth members
were scheduled to expire after the British EEC accession.
Before turning to the overall EEC trade policy towards
ASEAN manufactures it will be briefly discussed what impli-
cation may have followed from the twofold differential treat-
ment of two ASEAN members in one EEC sub-market.
1 9 Implications of the British EEC Entry for ASEAN
The two Commonwealth countries of the ASEAN, Malaysia and
Singapore, enjoyed a traditional preferential treatment on
the UK market until these preferences expired in January
1978. The exports of the other three ASEAN countries to the
1 9
See for this chapter particularly Peter Tulloch, The Seven
Outside. Commonwealth Asia's Trade with the Enlarged EEC,
Overseas Development Institute. London 1973. - UNCTAD, Ope-
ration and Effects of the Generalized System of Preferences,
TD/B/C.5/7, New York 1974. - Vincent Cable and Ann Weston,
South Asia's Exports to the EEC. Obstacles and Opportuni-
ties, Overseas Development Institute. London 1979.- 17 -
UK faced the usual MFN treatment during the fifties and six-
ties provided that the general GATT rules or - in the case
of the non-GATT member Thailand - bilateral special arrange-
ments were applied. Hence ASEAN countries never enjoyed a
homogenous tariff treatment on the UK market in the pre-GSP
period.
In 19 72 a homogenous treatment became theoretically possible
for the first time, when the UK established its own scheme
of a Generalized System of Preferences which included the
five ASEAN countries as beneficiaries. Since, however, the
Commonwealth preferences were initially not scheduled to be
phased out a totally homogenous tariff treatment towards
ASEAN had not been achieved: Malaysia and Singapore got the
option of claiming a preferential treatment under either
system and of choosing the more favourable one. Mainly due
to the original focus of all GSP schemes on semi-manufactu-
res and manufactures (CCCN-chapters 25-99), where the Bri-
tish GSP scheme offered equivalent options compared to the
Commonwealth preferences, the GSP in total was inferior to
the considerably wider range on intra-Commonwealth preferen-
tial treatment in agricultures. This original focus of the
GSP clearly met the UK's wishes to preserve the preferential
treatment of Commonwealth countries to the greatest extent
at least in its core, that means in processed agricultures
(CCCN 1-24).
Under these conditions it is not astonishing that UK imports
from Commonwealth Asia in 1972 claimed preferential treat-
ment under the Commonwealth preferences rather than under
the GSP.
The consequences from the UK GSP scheme for the ASEAN trade
flows to the UK may have theoretically consisted in some
trade diversion from Commonwealth ASEAN country sources to
the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. However, it seems
to be unlikely that trade diversion has been considerable
since a substitutive instead of a complementary export supply- 18 -
pattern between ASEAN countries only existed - if at all -
for some agricultures where the Commonwealth preferences
had not been essentially eroded . In the realm of semi-
manufactures and manufactures where the GSP could have
stimulated trade diversion, the trade overlap between Com-
menwealth and non-Commonwealth ASEAN countries on the UK
21
market and hence the scope for trade diversion was low
This status of preferential treatment of ASEAN exports to
the UK, however, deteriorated considerably when the UK en-
tered the EEC. The accession affected the ASEAN group as a
whole as well as the two Commonwealth members in particular.
As far as the group was concerned the deterioration was due
to the fact that the relatively liberal and "open-ended" GSP
scheme of the UK was superseded in 1974 by the more restric-
tive EEC scheme with its smaller product coverage and its
apriori limitations on preferential imports. Especially du-
ring the first years of the GSP application the ceilings were
not adequately adjusted to the growth rates of LDC exports
and thus rendered the EEC scheme "closed-ended" for many pro-
22
ducts soon . The erosion of preferences for Malaysia and
Singapore was even worse. They belonged to those seven coun-
60 percent of British dutiable imports from Malaysia and
56 percent of British dutiable imports from Singapore,
both in 1970, were excluded from the British GSP treat-
ment (mainly palm and coconut oils, palm nuts, canned
pineapples and shellfish). See Peter Tulloch, op.cit.,p.47.
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In 1968 Malaysia and Singapore comprised about 94 percent
of UK's imports in manufactures (except food, beverages and
tobacco) from ASEAN, whereas in 1975 this degree of regio-
nal concentration still amounted to 88 percent.
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See for some theoretical examples of the effect of the
adjustment formula Tracy Murray, op.cit., p. 69. - During
the last few years, however, an improvement of the EEC
scheme can be observed, mainly because the number of
"sensitive" products where the ceilings are binding has
been reduced, but also because the product coverage has
been improved by extending the list of processed agri-
cultures. As it will be analysed for ASEAN below, the
apriori limitations had no impact on the amount of pre-
ferential trade for non-sensitive products and were often
considerably exceeded in "quasi-sensitive" items before
the MFN tariff was reimposed.- 19 -
23 tries of Commonwealth Asia for which the EEC did not offer
an equivalent substitute for the Commonwealth preferences
which were scheduled to be eliminated till 1978.
In contrast to other independent Commonwealth developing
countries of the Caribbean, African and Pacific area say
Jamaica, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya or Tonga, an associate sta-
tus under the scheduled Lome Convention was denied to Com-
monwealth Asia. In view of the EEC policy not to erode the
"open-ended" tariff preferences of the Associates by means
of an equivalent GSP scheme ASEAN as a whole, but especially
Malaysia and Singapore had to suffer from a distinct dete-
rioration of their competitive footing with the associate
suppliers on the UK market. Neither the EEC GSP improve-
ments during the last years nor the non-preferential coope-
ration agreement of 1980 between the EEC and ASEAN have
been able to eliminate this deterioration fully.
However, the aspect of a de jure discrimination has to be
tackled separately from a de facto change of trade flows due
to this discrimination. Production cost advantages and the
costs of breaking the above mentioned inertia of traditional
trade relations may outweigh preference margins by far and
lacking competitiveness or other supply bottlenecks cannot
be compensated by changing ratios of preference margins be-
tween two countries or areas.
An estimate of the static value of preferences, that means
the fiscal costs of preferences for the donor (customs re-
venues forgone) clearly indicates that for Malaysia and
Singapore combined the value of preferences would have been
considerably larger if the EEC had adopted the UK GSP
scheme for processed agricultures instead of the actual case
24 that the UK adopted the EEC scheme . However, the essential
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Malay-
sia and Hongkong.
24
The ratio of the value of preferences between the two al-
ternatives amounts to 3:1 taken the 1970 imports of the UK
from the two ASEAN countries as the reference year. See
Peter Tulloch, op.cit., pp. 51-52.- 20 -
criterion of whether there has been a real deterioration of
the ASEAN competitive footing with other suppliers after
1973 on the UK market is the trade diversion evidence.
Though there is some evidence that during 1971 and 19 75 the
ASEAN share in the UK imports of processed agricultures
from developing countries slightly fell from about 10 per-
cent to 7.5 percent it is difficult to judge about whether
this was due to the erosion of the Commonwealth preferences
and the adoption of the EEC GSP scheme by the UK. The case
against trade diversion is that in spite of the UK adoption
of the relatively restrictive EEC GSP scheme with its apriori
ceilings in manufactures ASEAN could raise its share in the
UK manufacturing imports (without processed agricultures)
from developing countries from about 8 percent to 11 per-
cent during the same period and - due to the weight of ma-
nufactures against processed agricultures - from 8 to 10
percent for total manufacturing (including processed agri-
cultures). Moreever, there is no evidence that the EEC as-
sociates could benefit from the deterioration of ASEAN com-
petitive footing on the UK market, since their overall share
in the UK extra-EEC imports fell too. Another aspect which
makes it difficult to link the erosion of preferences with
changing regional trade flows, is that some processed agri-
cultures, for example refined sugar, are excluded from pre-
ferential treatment in any case, but are subjected to quota
and other restrictions. However, the considerable change of
the UK imports in processed agricultures from Commonwealth
ASEAN members to those from non-Commonwealth ASEAN members
in favour of the latter group can just be attributed to
sugar exports from the Philippines to the UK starting in 19 74.
To sum up, the UK accession to the community has ultimately
resulted in
- a distinct erosion of the preferences for Malaysia and
Singapore in this sub-market compared to the hypotheti-
cal situation with the Commonwealth preferences main-
tained and in- 21 -
- homogenous but less far-reaching tariff preferences for
all ASEAN members under the EEC GSP compared to the hypo-
thetical situation with the UK GSP scheme.
A direct evidence for an accession-induced trade diversion,
however, is low, at least for a trade diversion from ASEAN
sources to other LDC sources. If at all, the deterioration
of the preferential treatment may have prevented ASEAN from
gaining additional market shares in the UK market comparable
to those the group scored in other EEC sub-markets (table 2"),
Hence due to the accession, the UK market has been probably
rendered less absorptive towards ASEAN than the market could
have been with an autonomous, more open-ended preferential
trade policy.
The Overall ASEAN Export Performance under the EEC GSP Scheme
A first rough appraisal of the GSP product coverage in the
ASEAN manufactured export supply highlights a considerable
discrepancy between EEC imports from ASEAN in tariff items
covered by the GSP (so-called GSP-covered imports) and ac-
tual GSP-receiving imports (duty-free manufactured and
agricultural imports or agricultural imports at reduced
tariff rates): In 1978 GSP-receiving imports from ASEAN
amounted to only 35 percent of total imports in GSP tariff
items (table 9"). Compared with the corresponding figure
for all GSP beneficiaries of less than 27 percent this
does not seem to be a bad record at the first glance. What,
however, gives more rise to concern is the fact that the
EEC country deviations from the EEC average have been sub-
stantial by ranging between 17.5 percent for Italy at the mi-
nimum and 54.8 percent for Denmark at the maximum. One could
argue that this may be due to inter-EEC country differentials
in the structure of GSP imports from ASEAN so that countries
with a high share of sensitive goods where ceilings are
restrictive and obligatory would exhibit lower GSP trade
shares than those with a higher percentage of non-sensitive
goods where ceilings are open-ended. The empirical evidence,
however, does not support this argument. The absolute range- 22 -
of EEC country deviations from the average for non-sensi-
25
tive industrial goods has been even wider (from 10.4 per-
cent for French imports to 57.3 percent for Irish imports)
than for total manufactures.
Three systematic patterns emerge in general:
(1) GSP-receiving imports from ASEAN covered a significant-
ly lower share in total manufactured imports in France
2 fi
and Italy compared to the EEC average and a higher
share in Denmark irrespective of the degree of sensi-
tivity.
(2) The higher the degree of sensitivity the lower the GSP
trade share. That means that though the preference mar-
gin in sensitive goods proved to be highest among all
categories (between 12 and 15 percent) an early reimpo-
sition of MFN duties did not prevent ASEAN countries
from exporting under non-preferential conditions pro-
vided that there had not been any ultimate ceilings for
total exports.
(3) The lower the absolute volume of trade is the higher
the "utilization rate" of GSP options seems to be. This
perhaps could indicate a monopsonistic or oligopolistic
position of one or few experienced importers which
account for the bulk of the imports and which either
apply for the preferences or are even predesignated by
the national customs authorities as GSP users (by means
of import permit issues according to past trade flows).
The higher the trade volume is, the higher the probabi-
lity of a polypolistic market structure among the im-
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The category of semi-sensitive products which now has been
cancelled in the renegotiated GSP scheme starting from
1981 comprised "intermediate" cases which were under perma-
nent surveillance and which often faced an abrupt reimpo-
sition of MFN duties if the imports grew faster than apriori
determined by the ceilings.
In this respect Murray (op.cit., p. 76) and Weston et al.
(op.cit., pp. 44 sqq.) argue that in France and Italy but
also in the UK and Belgium importers are strongly linked
with domestic producers and their vested interests and that
protectionist pressures are there traditionally more appa-
rent than in West Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark.- 23 -
porters and higher therefore the number of those impor-
ters would be which either are unexperienced and hence
do not claim for preferences or which are discriminated
against the wellknown importers. This in fact may re-
duce the utilization rate.
Generally the GSP trade share is higher for agricultures
than for semi-manufactures and manufactures shifting ASEAN
countries whose export supply focus on agricultures, for
example Indonesia (table 10"), above the ASEAN average.
Since agricultures are mainly intermediates to be further
processed within the EEC and imported by few companies again
the argument of the competition structure within the import
trading sector may hold.
The GSP export performance of the individual ASEAN countries
(tables 10"- 14") does not deviate widely from the overall
ASEAN outcome except in the Singapore case (table 13") where
the relatively high percentage of sensitive and semi-sensi-
tive industrial goods in the export supply visibly shifts
the GSP trade share down to only 2 3 percent. Hence according
to this criterion Singapore's benefit from the GSP (if there
is any) seems to be the lowest one among all ASEAN members.
The country tables whose extensive interpretation would go
beyond the scope (and space) of the paper do not allow for
a definite answer to the question whether traditional trade
relations (Indonesia/Netherlands or Commonwealth ASEAN/UK)
foster a higher share of GSP trade in total trade or not.
Although the GSP share of both Benelux imports from Indo-
nesia (table 10") and UK imports from Malaysia (table 11")
clearly exceed the corresponding shares of imports from
ASEAN (table 9") this may reflect the sectoral structure
focussing on non-sensitive agricultures rather than the
impact of traditional trade links.
In total these preliminary and admittedly rough interpre-
tations of the ASEAN GSP trade in one year lend a first
support to doubts whether the GSP provides a trade incen-
tive at the margin, that means that it contributes to re-- 24 -
duce the costs of marginal exports. Assumed that exporters
would participate in the fiscal gains (the customs revenues
forgone) the gains could be used in subsidizing marginal
exports instead of retaining them as a "windfall" profit.
In this case the GSP would provide an indirect incentive to
expand exports, but the probability that exporters behave
27 in this way should not be assessed too high , even if this
behaviour may be typical for competitive markets like the
manufacturing markets in the EEC countries. The case against
this behaviour simply lies in the possibility that it is
the importer (especially the importer of "sensitive" goods
with predesignated import permits accordings to past trade)
2 8 who retains an extra-profit . All these cases against the
trade incentive element of the GSP are supported by the
ASEAN GSP trade shares which indicate that though the ma-
jority of EEC manufactured imports from ASEAN did not re-
ceive any preferential treatment the ASEAN countries anyhow
expanded their exports by volumes and by shares.
Due to its relatively low share in total manufactured im-
ports, the GSP-receiving trade does not correctly indicate
the ASEAN export performance within the EEC. Table 2 exhi-
bits a rising trend of the ASEAN shares in preferential im-
ports from LDCs in the EEC market as well in the most rele-
vant sub-market West Germany during 1973 and 1978/79. This
runs parallel to the overall performance for total ASEAN
manufactured (dutiable and non-dutiable) exports (table 8").
However, the rising trend for West Germany (from 7.5 per-
cent to 16.4 percent) falls behind that for the total EEC
(from 7.6 percent to 20.5 percent) although ASEAN - as al-
ready noted - succeeded in changing the regional structure
of its EEC exports towards this most absorptive sub-market
(table 2"). Hence it was the growth pattern of dutiable
manufactured exports which determined the export perfor-
27
See for this argument Vincent Cable and Ann Weston et al.,
South Asia's Exports to the EEC, op.cit., p. 6lT
2 8
Cf. Richard Cooper, The European Community's System of
Generalized Tariff Preferences: A Critique. Journal of
Development Studies, Vol. 8 (1972), pp. 379-394.- 25 -
mance rather than the pattern of the GSP-receiving exports.
In other words, though ASEAN got a bigger piece of the GSP
29 cake in the whole community than in West Germany , this
did not turn out to be a necessary precondition for an en-
forced import market penetration on the community level.
It is rather likely that the complex and time-consuming pro-
cedure of qualifying exports for preferential treatment (di-
rect consignment requirements, certificates of origin, mini-
mal-processing rules) detain the beneficiaries or small im-
porters from making use of the GSP options and that these
options are not indispensable for many exports. Another
bottleneck, however, evidently consists in the ceilings
which are often criticized to
- be inadequately adjusted to growing exports
- discriminate against successful suppliers and
- jeopardize the principle of the free circulation of
goods within the community.
The impact of the various ceilings for ASEAN will be high-
lighted in the following.
Ceilings for Semi-Sensitive and Sensitive Products
Though ceilings have been calculated for all kinds of GSP
products, they have been relevant as barriers only for semi-
sensitive and sensitive products. The former category has
now been eliminated so that as of 1981 importers have to
care about ceilings for semi-manufactures and manufactures
(except textiles and some steel products) only in the case
of about 90 sensitive goods where strict tariff quota, ma-
ximum-amount limitations and a rigid surveillance of goods
originating in major GSP suppliers (including Singapore and
in one case Malaysia) are likely to jeopardize any trade
expansion effect.
29
Table 2 yields that mainly the Malaysian and Singapore
semi-manufactures and manufactures as well as the Malaysian
agricultures (exports of vegetable oils to the UK) gained
overproportionally high shares in the EEC GSP trade com-
pared to West German GSP trade.- 26 -
Table 2 : Percentage Share of ASEAN in Total GSP Exports to the EEC and West
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The 1978 figures, however, yield some puzzling results
(table 15 ). Though the ceilings proved to be insufficient
to correspond to the higher export capacity of the benefi-
ciaries, they nevertheless exceeded the actual GSP-recei-
ving imports in sensitive industrial goods resp. semi-sen-
sitive industrial and agricultural goods so that the
beneficiaries in total did not exploit even the modest GSP
options notwithstanding their by far higher export capacity
in GSP tariff items. On the other hand a considerable por-
tion of ASEAN exports in these items had been dutiable
though ASEAN still scored a better utilization rate of the
GSP than the beneficiaries in total. One reason for this
outcome could be that the total export supply of LDCs con-
centrate on few competitive countries whose exports beyond
the maximum-amount limitations (butoirs) are denied GSP
tariff treatment. The consequence is that a portion of the
ceilings is reserved for minor LDCs which, however, suffer
from supply bottlenecks and cannot benefit from the GSP
options. Hence, by cutting the ceiling down to the butoir,
major suppliers are discriminated without benefiting the
minor LDCs
In case some empirical evidence could be found in favour
of this anti-major supplier bias in the GSP then ASEAN
members would be adversely affected since they proved to
be the major suppliers among the GSP beneficiaries in the
past for some products and thus faced MFN treatment beyond
the butoir. Table 16", however, which records all products
where ASEAN exports exceeded the butoir does not lend much
support to this hypothesis. There is only one case (Singa-
pore's exports of umbrellas) where an ASEAN country faced
MFN treatment for exports beyond the butoir although bene-
ficiaries in total did not fully exhaust the ceiling (9.0
Mill. EUA) with their GSP-receiving exports (8.7 Mill. EUA).
In any other case ASEAN exports were allowed to exceed the
butoir by far before facing the reimposition of tariffs and
so were all GSP beneficiaries exports concerning the cei-
ling. However, this seemingly liberal handling of the GSP
See for this argument Tracy Murray, op.cit., p. 71.- 28 -
only reflects the inadequateness of the ceilings and the
doubtfulness of the butoir compared with the export capa-
city of LDCs in general and the ASEAN countries in parti-
cular. For example, even the concession given to the Phi-
lippines, Malaysia and Thailand to export about 300 tons
knitted gloves duty-free instead of ex ante only 35 tons
at the maximum or the concession given to all beneficia-
ries to export 606 tons duty-free does not stimulate ex-
ports worth mentioning if at the same time the EEC market
absorbs seven times as much as the actual duty-free amount.
The few extraordinary cases recorded above, however, should
not be misinterpreted. In total ASEAN countries are not as
important suppliers for individual GSP products as Hongkong,
South Korea or Yogoslavia, so that on the average the GSP-
receiving exports of individual ASEAN members (not the ex-
ports of the group) did not exceed 50 percent of the butoir
in 19 78. More relevant than the butoir is the fact that the
ASEAN exports (and within the ASEAN group mainly Thailand's
exports) compete to some extent with other LDCs exports and
hence face MFN treatment beyond the total ceiling for all
beneficiaries even if ASEAN countries are minor suppliers.
Table 17
:
: which allows for a distinction between the two
reasons of tariff reimposition (high individual export ca-
pacity or high export capacity of GSP beneficiaries com-
bined) yields for the West German market a striking dif-
ference between Singapore where the former reason prevails
and Thailand where the latter one dominates and where ad-
ditionally the percentage of products affected is relati-
vely high (about two-third of Thailand's total exports under
GSP conditions).
Notwithstanding the costs of export incentives forgone due
to the tariff reimposition additional costs of uncertainty
arise for countries like Thailand whose GSP export supply
first strongly competes with that of other beneficiaries
and second focus on sensitive or quasi-sensitive goods.- 29 -
These costs have accrued from two sources of uncertainty
in the GSP scheme: First, not to know whether the ceiling
for a semi-sensitive product would become obligatory or
not, second not to know at what time all beneficiaries
would exhaust the ceiling and at what time consequently
some exports of an individual beneficiary like Thailand
would be charged duty.
Under these conditions Thailand may conclude that bene-
fiting from the GSP has something to do with a game of
chance or a day-by-day bargaining between experienced
(and lucky) importers and the EEC customs authorities for
ceilings which often become closed-ended already after
the first day of a year. The hypothesis that it is mainly
the importer who gains from the tariff exemptions on intra-
marginal (semi-sensitive and sensitive) exports of LDCs
under rules of uncertainty rather than the consumer or ex-
porter cannot be easily refused.
Sensitive goods provide an additional source of concern
about the GSP since they are subjected to the split of the
community ceiling into EEC country tariff quota (this is
the "burden sharing principle") according to merely rough
criteria such as GDP, population and trade. Though the
quota are theoretically useless in a customs union with
free internal circulation of goods they nevertheless in-
corporate protectionist elements. This is because they
provoke additional costs of indirect exports to an EEC
country A whose quota has been already exhausted via an
EEC country B whose quota is still open and which there-
fore does not charge duty on GSP products shipped to
country B. Hence there is an incentive to bear the cost
differentials between indirect and direct exports to
country A as long as the additional costs of indirect
exports do not exceed the duty avoided. If they do ex-
ports will be directly shipped to A and consequently be
charged duty. Since the costs may be high not only in terms
of transportation and of surmounting administrative bar-
riers within the EEC but also in terms of time-waste the- 30 -
case of both exhausted ceilings in A and unexhausted cei-
lings in B may be rather likely. Irrespective of whether
exports are shipped directly and charged with duties or
indirectly without duties but charged with additional
costs tariff quota introduce a protection equivalent in
favour of import-competing suppliers in the destination
country A.
Since the tariff quota are fixed on a product-by-product
basis and not on a country or country group basis it is
difficult to relate the tariff quota allocation only to
ASEAN exports. However, if we regard the EEC regional im-
port pattern towards ASEAN as being representative for all
beneficiaries then there is some evidence that the allo-
cation rule be it original or adjusted (table 18") did not
reflect the actual import pattern of EEC countries which
proved to be less or more absorptive towards ASEAN manufac-
tured exports. Nevertheless tariff quota does not seem to
have restrained ASEAN from directing its GSP exports to-
wards those EEC sub-markets which proved to be most ab-
sorptive under MFN-conditions. too.
The regional pattern of GSP-receiving exports is even more
distinct than that of total ASEAN exports in sensitive GSP
items (including dutiable exports). West Germany and Den-
mark are those two sub-markets whose absorption of duty-free
sensitive goods from ASEAN deviate to the greatest extent
from both their apriori quota as well as from their share
in EEC total imports of sensitive GSP items from ASEAN
(table 18-).
There is strong evidence that the extraordinarily high
duty-free import shares of West Germany and Denmark as
well as the low shares of France and Italy can be explained
by less or more protectionist attitudes of the national
authorities in administrating the tariff quota. Especially
France applies procedures which discriminate against out-
siders and which favour few traditional importers closely
linked to domestic manufacturers . Instead Denmark which
31
Cf. Ann Weston, op.cit., p. 83.- 31 -
generally pursues the most liberal trade policy towards LDCs
applies the open "first-come first-served" principle where
outsiders can effectively intensify competition in the im-
port trading sector. In general, whereas the restrictive
community ceilings for sensitive goods are likely to jeo-
pardize any incentive at the margin for overall ASEAN ex-
ports and among ASEAN countries especially for Thailand's
exports, the EEC country tariff quota do not seem to have
hampered ASEAN's orientation towards the most absorptive
EEC sub-market, West Germany.
Cumulative Origin Rules
There is no dissent in various empirical studies on the GSP
that restrictive rules of origin are one of the major ob-
stacles to a wider spread of preferences and that they tend
to slow down the value of imports actually receiving prefe-
rential treatment below the value of imports otherwise eli-
32 gible for preferences . A way out of this restriction is
the cumulation of various processing stages within the
group of beneficiaries. However, the EEC while applying
this liberal form of origin rules to imports from ACP
countries where inter-state trade and hence inter-state spe-
cialization is weak is rather reluctant to grant the same
for the more competitive GSP beneficiaries. An exception
is the partial cumulative treatment conceded to three inte-
gration schemes which are either advanced customs unions
(Central American Common Market) or on the half-way towards
internal trade liberalization (ASEAN, Andean Group).
Whether the partial cumulation treatment contributes to
reduce the share of dutiable ASEAN exports in preferential
items cannot be empirically checked because the customs
32
Besides the studies on the GSP already cited above UNCTAD
studies and replies from a questionnaire on the implemen-
tation of the GSP and on its shortcomings provided by
some GSP beneficiaries are worth to be mentioned here.
See UNCTAD, The GSP and the Lome Convention. TD/B/C.5/49/
Add. 1, 21 April 1977, and Replies from Preference-Receiv-
ing Countries, TD/B/C.5/54, 18 May 1977.- 32 -
declaration sheets for GSP treatment do not yet specify the
various stages of processing and the inter-state trade within
the integration schemes but only record that cumulation
treatment has been claimed and taken for granted.
However, some theoretical examples can be discussed which
refer to the different requirements of local processing.
First, the case where there is no minimum local value added
content required. Assumed that Malaysia imports raw cotton
from Egypt (CCT 5501) in order to produce cotton yarn (CCT
5505). The yarn is exported to Singapore where it is pro-
cessed to clothing (CCT 6101.) to be ultimately exported
into the EEC. The normal GSP origin rules require that the
so-called "double tariff item jump" (5501 -»- 5505 -*• 6101)
is done in one country so that the Singapore exports of
clothing would not fulfil the requirements under normal
origin rules. Since Malaysia and Singapore are taken as
one unit in the ASEAN cumulation treatment the exports of
clothing meet the GSP origin rules.
Second the case that the third country import content must
not exceed a certain limit. Assumed that Malaysia has a car
assembly plant producing cars (without seats) worth 100 units
with inputs from Japan worth 40 units. The cars are exported
to Singapore where the seats are installed worth 10 units
again with inputs from Japan worth 4 units. The complete
car with an ASEAN value added content of 66 units and an
Japanese input content of 44 units is exported from Singa-
pore to the EEC and meets the cumulative origin rule re-
quirements. Under normal rules GSP treatment would have
been denied since then the Malaysian value added would have
been regarded as a third country import content. However,
it is important to note that there is no cumulation of third
country inputs or local value added. The two processing
stages must both separately fulfil the minimum local value
added content of 60 percent.
The third case highlights this restrictive element in the
cumulation treatment. Some products, say radios or electro-- 33 -
nics are only qualified for GSP treatment if, in addition
to the minimum local value added content requirement, a
minimum of local materials originating in the country is
processed. Say that Malaysia assembles radios worth 100
units with 40 units Japanese inputs at the maximum, 50 units
local materials originating in Malaysia and with transistors
again originating in Malaysia. Only if these three require-
ments are met, the radio is taken as originating in Malaysia
and only then the radio can be exported to Singapore for
final processing (prior to GSP exports) worth say 20 units,
again with 8 units Japanese inputs and 10 units Singapore
inputs. So it is not possible to cut down for example the
local value added content in Malaysia to 55 units with 45
units third country inputs and with the other two require-
ments fulfilled, whereas in Singapore 17 units local value
added and 3 units Japanese import content would be added.
Inter-ASEAN specialization advantages are likely to concen-
trate on the processing of electronics and electrical equip-
ment where for instance inter-state wage differentials can
33
be used rather than on the textile production where ver-
tically integrated processing chains are already nationally
available and where there are not as large scale incentives
to spread processing over various countries as they exist
in the electrical equipment industries.
Hence the prohibition of cumulation in the processing of
goods where the EEC GSP scheme requires minimum percentages
of local value added (the more sophisticated engineering
and equipment industries) considerably erodes the value of
cumulative origin rules for ASEAN.
See for the underlying motives of intra-firm trade be-
tween various Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia
and Singapore the case of the Japanese Toko Inc. analysed
by Nakano Kenji, Inter-FTZs Operation of Japan's Electro-
nics Firms. In: Free Trade Zones & Industrialization in
Asia, Special Issue, Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, Pacific-
Asia Resources Center, Tokyo 1977, pp. 199-207.- 34 -
The ASEAN Gains from the GSP: A Brief Summary
EEC officials argue that a restrictive GSP scheme is better
than no GSP scheme at all and that its complexity only re-
flects the necessary compromise between vested domestic in-
terests and the export promotion demands of LDCs as well as
between major and minor suppliers. Though being doubtless
correct such a modest pretension does not coincide with the
initial GSP target to promote LDC manufactured exports by
reducing market access barriers in the industrialized coun-
tries, that means to eliminate export disincentives where
they exist: at the margin and not intra-marginally. In com-
parison to other developing countries especially of the
Latin American sphere Asian countries among which ASEAN
economies are outstanding together with India, Hongkong and
South Korea performed better and gradually increased their
share in duty-free or duty-reduced LDC manufactured and
34 agricultural exports to the EEC
But perhaps this performance might also be explained by
more (compared to Latin American competitors) world market-
oriented factor price policies including exchange rate po-
licies, by more footloose export-oriented foreign investments
in manufactures, by more skill availability both on the en-
trepreneur and on the employee side etc. and hence would
have happened without preferences anyway.
A definite answer cannot be given but instead some tenta-
tive judgement on the various facets of the GSP puzzle is
possible:
34
Taiwan should be mentioned separately since it is excluded
from the EEC GSP but nevertheless scored extraordinarily
high export growth rates. See for a discussion of argu-
ments why Latin America has fallen behind Asian competi-
tors in world manufactured exports in general and in manu-
factured exports to the EEC in particular Gustav Ranis,
Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Asia's Super-Expor-
ters: Implications for Manufactured Exports from Latin
America. Yale Economic Growth Center, Discussion Paper No.
358, August 1980. - Rolf J.Langhammer, EEC Trade Policies
and Latin American Export Performance. A Discussion of
Causalities. Intereconomics, 5/1980, pp. 246-251.- 35 -
First, if there is any export incentive at all then the
non-sensitive goods are most likely to profit, since there
is no uncertainty on whether ceilings become closed-ended
or not, and hence no race for scarce quotas and less oppor-
tunities for monopoly importers to put the tariff revenues
saved in their pockets as a windfall profit
However, EEC MFN tariff reductions have been advanced par-
ticularly in the non-sensitive sector where its average
preference margin amounted to only 7.8 percent in 1976
(against 8.9 percent for semi-sensitive and 12.1 percent
for sensitive products). Thus, though two thirds of the
1978 EEC GSP-receiving imports from ASEAN concentrated on
non-sensitive agricultures and manufactures (table 9") the
export expansion stimulus may have been low because of the
low preference margins. This argument in underlined by the
ASEAN specific export pattern of dominating non-sensitive
agricultures where the preference margin is particularly
cut down due to the fact that in agricultures tariff re-
ductions instead of tariff exemptions prevail. The scenario
may differ among the ASEAN countries especially between
Malaysia and Singapore, the former being the major exporter
of agricultures and the latter focussing on manufactures
of all three degrees of sensitivity.
Second, sensitive or semi-sensitive exportables which are
relevant mainly for Thailand, Singapore and to some extent
the Philippines do hardly offer some scope for export incen-
tives. Ceilings are rigid and though not being always strict-
ly applied, inadequate compared to the export capacity of
the major suppliers. Tariff revenues are saved only for
intra-marginal exports and hence may be passed to the im-
porter rather than to the consumer or exporter. Among the
The ODI-study by comparing growth rates of exports of
various beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to various
donor and non-donor countries concludes that some export
incentives have been working in the non-sensitive machi-
nery sector. See Ann Weston, op.cit., p.139 seq.
See Axel Borrmann, op.cit., table, p. 135.- 36 -
ASEAN countries Thailand seems to be mostly affected by
ceilings as well as butoirs.
Third, while there is no empirical evidence on the effect
of cumulative origin rules for ASEAN, the prohibition of
cumulation for products with minimum limits of a local
value added content allows for the apriori judgement that
this restriction jeopardizes the major part of incentives
of an inter-ASEAN country vertical specialization in sophi-
sticated manufactures.
Fourth, the EEC does not pursue a homogenously liberal po-
licy of administrating quota and ceilings. Even in non-
sensitive products some EEC members seem to have created
additional national barriers against the inflow of GSP
products. Countries as France and Italy clearly deviate
from the more liberal partners Denmark and West Germany.
Fifth, the "trade" effect seems to be confined but so does
the "aid" effect (table 19"). By multiplying the average
preference margin by the GSP-receiving exports as well as
by the butoir something like the actual and hypthetical
fiscal gains from the GSP for exporting countries can be
assessed provided that the tariff revenue forgone is fully
passed to the exporter. That this is evidently not the
case has been discussed above under the heading of closed-
ended ceilings, intra-marginal exports, and uncertainty.
These three aspects provide clear incentives for importers
to collect the revenues forgone as a windfall profit. But
even if this would not happen the actual gains for ASEAN
in total of 74 Mill. US-^ and the national hypothetical
gains of about 58 Mill. US-# at the maximum for Philippines
would be negligible compared to official grants of more than
410 Mill. US-# which ASEAN received in 19 78 by DAC donor
. . 38 countries
Of course the maximation of individual gains would cut
down the gains of the other countries, because of the bu-
toir which cannot be exhausted by all ASEAN countries
simultaneously.
3 8
DAC/OECD, Development Co-operation, 1979 Review Paris,
November 19 79, table B.3.- 37 -
To sum up: This is not to say that the EEC GSP scheme has
not been favourable for various individual ASEAN exporters.
What, however, gives rise to concern - notwithstanding the
details - is that actual GSP-receiving imports still only
cover a relatively small portion of EEC imports from ASEAN
in GSP-covered items (even in non-sensitive items) and that
ASEAN countries will be increasingly faced with the "anti-
major supplier" bias of the national customs authorities.
National Protectionism within the EEC and its Impact on
39 ASEAN Manufactured Exports
Up to now the EEC trade policy has been assumed to be a
community instrument being homogenous to the greatest ex-
tent irrespective of the various EEC countries concerned.
However, notwithstanding national pecularities in the ad-
ministration of GSP tariff quotas as well as national non-
tariff barriers such as subsidies, government procurement,
standards and regulations etc., the EEC is in fact a "not-
40 so-perfect customs union" . Since its foundation it has
preserved the right for its individual members to maintain
national import quotas for a wide range of products outside
the so-called common liberalization list.
Besides this heritage from the pre-integration period the
EEC has additionally fixed both community import quotas
and national shares in quotas for textiles in the various
voluntary export self-restraints agreements (VESRA) estab-
lished between the EEC and the major LDC textile suppliers
among which are also the five ASEAN countries. Assumed an
individual EEC member decides to stop imports exceeding
39
This chapter summarizes the findings published in detail in
Rolf J. Langhammer, Nationaler Protektionismus im Rahmen
der EG-Handelspolitik, dargestellt am Beispiel der Indu-
striegiiterimporte aus ASEAN-Landern, Die Weltwirtschaft,
1981, H. 1.
40
Juergen B. Donges, What is Wrong with the European Communi-
ties? Eleventh Wincott Memorial Lecture, The Institute of
Economic Affairs, London 1981, p. 10 seq.- 38 -
4 1
the apriori fixed quota then this national protectio-
nist instrument can only be effective if besides the di-
rect imports the indirect imports (via other EEC countries
whose markets are still open) are also cut off. Since the
interruption of trade among EEC countries requires a for-
mal sanction of the EEC commission, the frequency of the
so-called non-application procedure of community treatment
(Art..115 EEC treaty), shortly the closing of one EEC
sub-market against imports from a specific third country
can be taken as an indicator of actual national protec-
tionism.
Table 20" provides an EEC country-ASEAN country frequency
distribution of such national barriers against indirect
imports (and consequently also against direct imports)
from ASEAN during 1976 and 1979. The pattern clearly de-
notes France, the UK, and Ireland as the three outstanding
countries which delinked from ASEAN textile fabrics and
clothing exports. There is a difference between the three
countries, however, in as much as Ireland confined the
barriers to clothing whereas France and the UK frequently
interrupted the wide range of indirect and direct textile
fabrics and clothing imports mainly from Thailand (inclu-
ding the only non-textile product, tiles). A frequency
distribution of individual EEC country import licencing
42 against ASEAN textile exporters as fixed in the five VESRA
41
To make use of the right to stop imports beyond the quota
is only an option. The experience suggests that some EEC
countries frequently claim this option whereas other
countries tend to use quota only as a "fleet in being" by
which exporting countries can be disciplined or as a
means of last resort.
42
Individual EEC country import licencing means that if the
textile exports of individual LDC suppliers to an EEC
member exceed the apriori fixed member share in the com-
munity quota and that if consultation talks fail this
EEC member can claim to fix absolute maximum import
amounts for the following years being valid only for its
market and being strictly licenced by both supplier and
EEC country authorities (export and import licences
according to the so-called double-check).- 39 -
displays a similar pattern. Again France and the UK com-
prised more than 50 percent of total EEC countries import
licences against ASEAN countries among which again Thai-
land has been most seriously affected. Denmark and West
Germany range at the end of the protection scale as mea-
sured by both frequency distributions.
In addition the per capita maximum import amounts of indi-
vidual EEC countries against ASEAN textiles and clothings
(table 21") differ widely among the countries concerned and
thus lend support to the assumption that the national au-
thorities each follow very different criteria in fixing
the maximum amounts.
It can only be very tentative to sketch the amount of im-
ports from ASEAN forgone due to diverging national pro-
tectionist policies. One way bases on the observation that
the protectionist "leaders" in textiles are not surpri-
singly those EEC partners whose share of textile and clo-
thing imports in domestic apparent consumption lagged be-
hind the EEC average of about 13 percent in 1976. If these
countries (France, Italy, Belgium, the UK and Ireland)
would have reduced their textile protectionism down to
the community level and if this would have resulted in
an increase of their import share in apparent consumption
up to the EEC average by replacing domestic production,
then the ASEAN share in additional textile imports of the
five EEC countries could have amounted to about 60 Mill.
US-# or 40 percent of the 1976 textile imports of the
five countries from ASEAN.
Causes of National Protectionism
In search of some causes for different degrees of national
protectionism against ASEAN (and of course against other
competitive suppliers) three hypotheses shall be briefly
discussed.- 39a -
First, inter-EEC country differences in employment losses
due to worsening trade balances with ASEAN in import-com-
peting branches such as textiles.
Second, vested interests of some EEC country investors in
areas whose exports in the past enjoyed a privileged access
to individual EEC markets and whose privileges have been
gradually eroded, for instance export-oriented investments
in former colonies or other areas of strong bilateral ties
(Mediterranean area).
Third, in general different institutional backgrounds for
protectionism in EEC countries.
The underlying calculations for the first aspect are based
on familiar input-output techniques by which the demand
for employment due to final demand changes, in our case
changes of net trade balances within a period, is assessed
via the domestic transaction matrix and the average secto-
ral employment-gross output-ratio (table 3). This ceteris
paribus approach may of course be generally questioned
notwithstanding the usual critics against the application
43 of outdated tables for actual problems . However, since
43
For instance, underemployment on the job is excluded
and so is consequently the reaction of employers to
reduce labout X-inefficiency if final demand changes.
Other reaction patterns such as stronger international
linkages instead of maintaining domestic ones or techno-
logically determined changes in capital-labour-ratios in
branches negatively affected by import competition are
also ruled out. Furthermore the use of average employment-
output ratios instead of incremental ones tend to under-
estimate employment losses in labour-intensive branches
where the incremental ratios are probably higher at the
margin than intra-marginally and to overestimate employ-
ment gains in capital-intensive branches where the in-
cremental capital-labour ratio is likely to exceed the
average one. See for the presentation and the critique
of this procedure Errol Grinols and Erik Thorbecke, The
Effects of Trade between the U.S. and Developing Coun-
tries on U.S. Employment. In: Edmond Malinvaud and Jean-
Paul Fitoussi (Eds.), Unemployment in Western Countries.
Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Eco-
nomic Association at Bischenberg/France, London 1980,
pp. 101-134.- 40 -
Table 3: Employment Gains and losses
and 1975, in Number of Jobs
























































































































































a Calculated by the following formula: A E± = ? ~ r±. (xT
5 - M?

































Y~ is the 1968/75 average sectoral labour-gross output-ratio (direct use of primary factor E in sector i to
i produce output X) in
sector j (element in
±e respective EEC-country, r.. the total direct and indirect use of sector i by .
the inverse Leontief matrix derived from the domestic transactions matrix A
of the respective EEC-country) and X. resp. M. the EEC-exports to resp. imports
change in the trade balance between ^ 1968 and 1975 is thus sector's j final
additional production and
each sector i is the total
sector j (j = 1 ... n).
The national gross output
US-g.
Employment in the sectors i (i = 1 ... n). The overall
of individual employment changes caused by changes in
from ASEAN in sector j. The
demand change which requires
employment effect A E in
the trade balance of each
figures have been made compatible by converting them from national currencies into
Since for Belgium only value added data were available gross output figures have been estimated by multiplying
the sectoral gross output-value added-ratios of the Netherlands by the Belgian value added data. Thus we assume
the same value added content for the Belgian manufacturing sector as for the Netherlands.
Source: ON, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, various issues. - UN , Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1977. -
UN, Growth of World Industry, 1973. - IBRD World Tables 1980. - UN/ECE, Standardized Input-output Tables
of ECE Countries for Years around 1965, New York 1977. - Own calculations.- 41 -
our concern relates to inter-EEC country differences in net
employment effects rather than to precise magnitudes of
jobs lost and gained, the "naive" input-ouput-approach
can be justified.
The calculations suggest that while the intensified indu-
strial division of labour between the EEC and ASEAN stimu-
lated more gains in jobs in the human capital-intensive
sectors than losses in the traditional labour-intensive
sectors in all EEC countries between the 1968/75 period,
the branch concentration of losses as the probably poli-
tically more relevant criterion for national protection
differs by countries. The share of the textiles and clo-
thing sector involved in employment losses ranges from 5
percent in Belgium to 100 percent for Ireland resp. 90 per-
cent for France. These are just those two countries which
after 19 75 pursued the most explicit national maximum im-
port amount policy against ASEAN suppliers, together with
the UK.
As the national protectionism is not a global one but a
highly selective complement to the community "base" pro-
tectionism and as the domestic pressure for additional
protection can be easier internationally justified on a
selective branch basis than in a global context - apart
from the rather effective political pressure of well-or-
ganized sectoral trade and employers unions -, the branch
concentration of employment losses in some EEC countries
may provide some explanations for national protectionism.
Arguments like the low overall employment incidence of
the division of labour with ASEAN or the inter-sectoral
shifts of employment and growth as well as the presumably
positive net employment balance evidently exert a minor
influence in the political bargaining for protection than
sectorally confined considerations.
The second hypothesis that vested capital owner interests
play an important role in explaining national protectionism
is supported by the fact that especially France but also- 42 -
the Benelux countries and Italy traditionally import tex-
tiles from ACP- and Mediterranean countries where they had
established export-oriented affiliates under privileged
trade relations between the home country and the host
country. These bilateral ties had to be both modified
within the course of the EEC internal integration process
and sometimes eroded. The more the regional discrimination
especially on the French market slowed down to the detri-
44 ment of exports from former colonies and the more the
cost advantages of ASEAN suppliers emerged, the more
quantitative restrictions have been demanded as a substi-
tute for past market access guarantees of traditional
45 suppliers. Table 4 displays that ASEAN textile suppliers
penetrated much stronger in the relatively open West Ger-
man market than did the ACP- and Maghreb competitors
whereas the situation was reverse on the three other more
protected markets of France, the Benelux countries and
Italy. The extraordinarily high regional disequilibrium for
French imports in textile intermediates exhibits a strong
French intra-firm trade component in trade between the
home country and its former dependencies for which high
protection has been seeked and granted.
Table 4 : Ratio Between EEC Country Imports from Franco-
phone ACP Countries plus Maghreb and ASEAN in



















Source: Eurostat, Analytical Tables of Foreign Trade
NIMEXE - 1979, Vol. F, Luxembourg 19 80.
44
See for an analysis of the crisis of the French textile in-
dustry and their foreign investments in ACP countries Lynn
Krieger Mytelka and Suzanne Bonzon Laurent. Vers une
Troisieme Crise du Textile? Reperes, Paris, No. 67, Nov.-
Dec. 1979, pp. 34-41.
45
The tariff headings 5509 and 6101/6102 represent the core
of textile protectionism against ASEAN.- 43 -
Neither sectorally conentrated employment losses nor
vested interests of EEC capital owners are sufficient pre-
conditions for national protectionism. They describe moti-
ves of pressure,groups which demand protection but do not
explain why the supply of protection is actually provided
by the national authorities. Traditionally the institutio-
nal background of protection widely differs between the
individual EEC members and has for example influenced the
extent to which the partners agreed to abolish national
quota on specific imports since the establishment of a
common trade policy in 1968 and to pass these goods over
to the common liberalization list
Though the empirical evidence strongly suggests to rank
France, the UK and Italy at the upper end of the protection
scale and Denmark as well as West Germany at its lower end
it is difficult to give concrete and generally valid cri-
teria of the underlying roots. Each country condemns a
global protectionism, while to a different degree pleading
for safeguard measures against "concurrence anormale"
whatever this means.
The more, however, trade unions and employer associations
dominate both the public discussion and the adviser insti-
tutions for the government against consumer associations
and trade boards, the more it is likely that the secto-
rally confined view of selective safeguard measures against
imports will be shared by the officials. The 1978 voting
In 1978 still 20 percent of EEC imports of semi-manufac-
tures and manufactures (CCT 25-99 minus 27, (mineral oils))
from LDCs was not commonly liberalized, in other words,
this part of imports was still subjected to national im-
port quota (and hence to national trade policy competence)
in at least one member country. Again France and the UK
take the lead in national quota towards LDCs exports; 11
resp. 12 percent of their respective imports from LDCs
faced national quota-followed by Italy. The ranking list
shifts to Italy as the leader in quantitative restrictions
towards extra-EEC sources in general due to import quota
on cars from DCs outside the EEC. Again West Germany keeps
the stern-light of the protection convoy. See for further
details Rolf J. Langhammer, Nationaler Protektionismus,
op.cit., Table 1.- 44 _
behaviour of the institutional member groups in the French
economic consultant board for the government, the Conseil
47 Economique et Social , exhibits some evidence as far as
the French position in the New International Industrial
Division of Labour is concerned: Employer associations,
the representatives of the medium-sized enterprises as
well as the conservative and socialist trade unions voted
in favour of a draft report and a policy recommendation
provided by the industrial and commercial section of the
Conseil and pleading for both selective French safeguard
measures against "concurrence anormale" and a "Buy French"
campaign. The communist trade unions were the only groups
which voted against the draft, but only because of a
lacking condemnation of multinationals and their role in
the international division of labour, whereas some non-
aligned persons and the representatives of the overseas
territories abstained from voting. Neither consumer asso-
ciations nor trade boards were heard, though being insti-
tutional members in the Conseil, however, with only few
votes. The ODI-study reports on similar institutional
linkages between both producers and trade unions and their
powerful partners in the ministries, the industry sections
48 and the customs authorities
During the latest time the divergencies within the EEC
between more and less protectionist members seem to have
aggravated notwithstanding the internal subsidy competi-
tion in steel products. Especially the textile imports
from LDCs increasingly face protectionist resistance first
because the various pressure groups gathered in order to
provide a favourable background for a more restrictive,
new MFA-agreement starting from 1982. Second, because
47
See L'Avenir des Industries Franyaises et la Nouvelle
Repartition Internationale de la Production Industrielle,
Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise, Avis et
Rapports du Conseil Economique et Social No. 4, 1979,
2 7 January 19 79.
48
Ann Weston, op.cit., pp. 44-52.- 45 -
France again took the lead in the national protectionism
by classifying the French textile industry as a "strate-
gically important industry" (a de facto status quo gua-
rantee) and by establishing rigid origin certificate
controls in EEC internal trade against indirect imports
49 mainly via West Germany (March 1981)
The most disturbing aspect of this new wave of national
protectionism seems to be the fact that LDC suppliers
flexibly react to it by shifting exports to the more ab-
sorptive and open sub-markets - as it also happened in
the ASEAN case - and hence encourage a national protec-
tionism also in these markets where pressure groups argue
in terms of a regional disequilibrium in the community
burden sharing towards LDCs exports. In this context na-
tional protectionism becomes more epidemic within the
EEC, the more the regional shifts of exports as a reac-
tion to forerunners in protectionism coincide with an
overall poor economic growth performance in the import
market as it is now the case.
Outlook
Though ASEAN manufactured exports towards the EEC exhi-
bited an overproportional performance during the last
decade - compared to other less developed countries ex-
ports - and though the institutional trade relations be-
tween the two groups steadily improved and culminated in
the non-preferential trade and cooperation agreement of
March 1980, numerous tariff and particularly non-tariff
barriers against ASEAN still exist as has been shown
above.
49
- The French customs authorities argue that the free EEC-
internal trade has been increasingly abused. In fact the
pecularities of free trade between the two German states
allow for some abuse in origin certificates if for example
textile products originating from Asian countries are ex-
ported to the FRG via the GDR and if the products have
ultimately passed the West German customs clearance with
a GDR origin certificate.— 4 6 *~
More relevant than the actual status at the beginning
of the eighties are the protection forecasts for the next
decade which are far from being rosy:
First, the EEC is facing strong diverging national inte-.
rests and internal conflicts between more and less libe-
ral members and it is not unlikely that LDCs export inte-
rests (except those of ACP countries) will be sacrificed
in order to keep the community running. The renegotiated
MFA-agreement could bring the first proof of this hypo-
thesis .
Second, the EEC will be enlarged by Mediterranean coun--
tries whose export manufactures (in the case of Greece
and Portugal, perhaps later on of Turkey) focus on sensi-
tive items also supplied by ASEAN. Hence the prolongation
of protection in these categories is most likely and this
will outweigh the perspectives of a larger EEC market for
ASEAN goods.
Third, trade preferences towards LDCs are increasingly
seen as a burden resp. as an aid element rather than as
an instrument of real income gains or an incentive of in-
ternal and international structural changes. Consequently
preferences will be concentrated on least developed coun-
tries and be gradually frozen for major suppliers as for
examples the ASEAN countries. Notwithstanding this gra-
dual erosion the preferences will in any case be princi-
pally eroded if MFN tariff cuts are continued. Safeguards
and the less transparent non-tariff barriers which are
more difficult to be tackled in GATT rounds will provide
an effective substitute to tariff barriers.
Fourth, the ACP countries will be furthermore given prio-
rity in EEC trade policies. For some ASEAN countries es-
pecially Malaysia this priority might be crucial since
EEC-ACP cooperation will include financial and technical
EEC sponsorship for export-oriented investments in agri-- 47 -
cultural processing (such as refining of vegetable oils)
where ASEAN and ACP countries are competing units.
The assets of ASEAN needed in order to minimise the ad-
verse effects are reciprocity in trade negotiations, the
diversification potential of the ASEAN economies and the
ongoing integration process, the increasing attractive-
ness for EEC investors (especially after the expectations
with regard to the Chinese market proved to be unreali-
stic) , the political stability, the natural resource basis
and the endowment with financial intermediates.
Special interest should be devoted to intra-firm trade
between ASEAN and the EEC since apart from mutual gains
in specialization and economies of scale a strong intra-
firm component would probably weaken the protection
coalition between EEC trade unions and domestic produ-
cers having been the most powerful barrier to EEC im-

































































































































a See for the industrial classification scheme based on the three-digit SITC data
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Sources: UN, Commodity Trade Statistics, current issues.Table 2
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Sources: UN, Commodity Trade Statistics, various issues.- 5O -
Table 3
S
{ Real Exchange Rate Changes
a of ASEAN Country Currencies
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n the nominal exchange of ASEAN country A
ratio between the ASEAN country
, r^ the nominal exchange rate of
the ratio between




















instead of the wholesale price index.
Sources: Calculated from IBRD, World Tables 1980, Washington 1980,
IMF, Financial Statistics, current issues.Table 4* i Trade Balance
















































































































































































































































































































































































































where x. . resp. n. ., denote the exports resp. imports of an EEC-country
























































































































































Sourcei Calculated from UN, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, various issues- 53 -
Table 6": Structure of Revealed Ccnparative Advantages of EEC vis-a-vis







































































































































































Source: See table 2".Table 7":Trade Overlap between Manufactured GSP Exports (except textiles) from
ASEAN Members to West Germany 1979
"\Country
























ASEAN country a's manufactured preferential export under a four-
digit CCCN-item i to West Germany, and X. (b) ASEAN country b's
export respectively.
Source: Data on GSP imports provided by the West German Ministry
of Economics.- 55 -
Table 8
::: Import Market Penetration of 'ASEAN Manufactures








































































































































Source: Calculated from: UN, Commodity Trade Statistics, current
issues. - UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and
Development Statistics, current issues.Table 9*sEEC Imports from ASEAN under the GSP by GSP Categories 1978




























































in percent of total ESC imports
from ASEAN in GSP tariff items
in Mill. US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from ASEAN in GSP tariff items
in Mill. US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from ASEAN in GSP tariff items
in Mill. US-8
in percent of total EEC- imports
from ASEAN in GSP tariff items
in Mill. US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from ASEAN in GSP tariff items
in Mill. US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from ASEAN in GSP tariff items
in Mill. US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from ASEAN in GSP tariff items
in Mill. US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from ASEAN in GSF tariff items
in Mill. US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from ASEAN in GSP tariff items
in Mill. US-8
in percent of total EEC imports















































































































The data have been converted from European Units of Account (EUA) into US-$ by the rate 1 U8 - O.837 EUA
Discrepances between the sum of the individual categories and the total figure are due to rounding.


























in percent of total EEC imports
from Indonesia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports /
from Indonesia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Indonesia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Indonesia in GSF tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Indonesia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Indonesia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Indonesia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 XJS-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Indonesia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Indonesia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 TTS-8
in percent of total EEC Imports








































































a The data have been converted from European Units of Account (EUA) into US-$ by the rate 1 U$ - 0.837 EUA


































































































in percent of total SEC imports
from Malaysia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Malaysia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 TJS-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Malaysia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-S
in percent of total EEC imports
from Malaysia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Malaysia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$'
In percent of total EEC imports
from Malaysia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Malaysia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-J
in percent of total EEC imports
from Malaysia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Malaysia in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-*
in percent of total EEC imports






































































a The data have been converted from European Units of Acoount (ETTA) into US-$ by the rate 1 U$ - 0.837 EUA







































































































in percent of total EEC imports
from Philippines in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Philippines in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in peroent of total EEC imports
from Philippines in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$'
in percent of total EEC imports
from Philippines in GSP- tariff items
in 1000 TJS-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Philippines in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US- $
in percent of total EEC imports
from Philippines in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Philippines in GSP tariff items
in 1000 IJS-S
in percent of total EEC imports
from Philippines in GSP tariff items
in 1000 TJS-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Philippines in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-S
in percent of total EEC imports











































































a The data have been converted from European Units of Account (EUA) into US-S by the rate 1TT$ - 0.837 EUA











































































































in percent of total EEC imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC -imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items
in .1000 IJS-8
in percent of total EEC- imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items
in 1000 0S-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items
in 1000 TJS-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Singapore in GSP tariff items

































































































































































in 1000 US-$ °
in percent of total EEC imports
from Thailand in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC- imports
from Thailand in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Thailand in GSP tariff items
in 1000 VS-t
in percent of total EEC imports
from Thailand in GSP tariff items
in 1000 TJS-8
in percent of total EEC imports
from Thailand in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total ETC- imports
from Thailand in GSP- tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC- imports
from Thailand in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC- imports
from Thailand in GSP tariff items
in 1000 US-$
in percent of total EEC imports
from Thailand in GSP tariff items
in 1000 TTS-$
in percent of total EEC imports













































































a The data have been converted from European Units of Account (EUA) into US-$ by the rate 1U$ - 0.837 EUA





























































































GSP Ceilings in Percent
if total EEC Imports
from the Beneficiaries


















































Defined as the ratio between the percentage share of preferential EEC imports from ASEAN (in GSP tariff items) and
the corresponding percentage share for all GSP-beneficiaries.
Data converted from EUA into US-0.
e Ceilings for sensitive textiles are only recorded in terms of quantities. Since the share of GSP imports in total
EEC imports from GSP-beneficiaries in sensitive textiles amounted to 7.1 percent only, the ceiling has been
probably fully exhausted.
Source: See table 14























































































































Those products were denominated as being relevant for ASEAN, where ASEAN countries were the major suppliers among the GSP-beneficiaries on the
EEC market in 1978 and where their exports were partly faced with MFN tariffs because they exceeded the apriori maximum amount limit for a
single beneficiary (butoir). All products recorded above ware classified by the EEC-authorities as "quasi- or semi-sensitive" goods.
ON.
U)










Reason of Reimposition of MFN Tariffs on
Exhausted "Butoirs" (Maximum Amount)
































































Called tariff-quota which are as follows for all sensitive products: Benelux 10.5
ceiling, Danmark 5 percent, France 19 percent, West Germany 27.5 percent, Ireland











































percent of the community
1 percent, Italy 15 per-
Source: Calculated from data provided by the West German Ministry of Economics.- 65 -
Table 18": EEC Ceiling Allocation Rule for "Sensitive" GSP Goods Versus the Actual








Actual Pattern of EEC Iitports in


















Total EEC imports of sensitive agricultures, textiles and other semi-manufactu-
res and manufactures from ASEAN, except tariff item 44.15 (plywood) where -due
to traditionally strong export flows from Singapore and Malaysia to the UK -the
UK received a quota of 84.5 percent instead of the normal 22.0 percent.
80 percent of the ooimrunity ceiling are allocated according to the original alloca-
tion rule, whereas the remaining 20 percent (community reserve) are allocated
according to the actual trade pattern. In this respect, however, the EEC has im-
posed another restriction insofar as EEC member states could claim an additional
quota only up to a limit of 40 percent of the original quota. For the case of
1978 it is assumed that the two members with the highest discrepancy between ori-
ginal quota and actual import pattern (West Germany and the UK) drew each 40 per-
cent of their original quota on the camnunity reserve and that the (negligible)
rest of 0.2 percentage points has been equally divided among the other five EEC-
states resp. groupings (Benelux). It is implicitly assumed that the member states
did not reallocate their original quota among each other in 1978.Table 19
:=: G^P induced Fiscal Gains

























































a Actual GSP trade of an ASEAN-country multiplied b}
Hypothetical GSP trade of an ASEAN-country






























































































r the average tariff preference margin of each GSP-category.















Source: In addition to the Eurostat-microfiches Axel Borrmann et al. Das Allgemeine Zollpraferen2System der EG, Hamburg
Weltarchiv GmbH, 1979, Table 43.p.135 . Own calculations.- 67 -
Table 2O
5* : Non-Application of Community Treatment
0
tures, 1976 - 1979.
vis-a-vis ASEAN Suppliers in Manufac-





























































































































































Non-application of Community treatment according to Art. 115.1 EEC-treaty means that a pro-
duct originating in a third country may not be imported by the EEC-country claiming for
the regulation via other EEC countries where this product is in free circulation. The pro-
hibition of so-called indirect imports is a supplement to individual import licencing of
EEC members.
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities, current issues.- 68 -
Table 21" : Deviations in Per Capita Import Quota in Textiles
vis-a-vis ASEAN Countries in 1977 (Indices: Highest































































Source: See table 2O
5
C